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Abstract
Reversible logic has two main properties. First, the number
of inputs is equal to the number of outputs. Second, it
implements a one-to-one mapping; i.e., one can reconstruct
the inputs from the outputs. These properties enable its appli-
cations in building quantum computing architectures.
In this paper we study reverse engineering of reversible
logic circuits, including reverse engineering of non-reversible
functions embedded into reversible circuits. We propose the
number of embeddings of non-reversible functions into a
reversible circuit as the security metric for reverse engineering.
We analyze the security benefits of automatic synthesis of
reversible circuits. We use our proposed security metric to
show that the functional synthesis approaches yield reversible
circuits that are more resilient to reverse engineering than the
structural synthesis approaches. Finally, we propose scram-
bling of the inputs and outputs of a reversible circuit to thwart
reverse engineering.
Index Terms—Reversible logic, Reverse engineering, Security,
Structural synthesis, Functional synthesis, BDD synthesis, QMDD
synthesis, Number of embeddings.
I. INTRODUCTION
The globalization of the design flow for integrated cir-
cuits (ICs) leads to security vulnerabilities such as re-
verse engineering [1], IC counterfeiting, Intellectual Prop-
erty (IP) piracy, unauthorized overproduction by the contract
foundry [2], [3], and malicious circuit modification [4]. An
adversary anywhere in the design flow can reverse engineer
the IP/IC, steals its ownership, and make pirated copies.
An untrusted foundry can overbuild ICs and distribute them
illegally. Furthermore, detailed knowledge of the design can
allow one to identify sensitive parts of the design and make
malicious modifications, refereed to as Hardware Trojans.
Reverse engineering can discover the technology used in
the device [5], extract the gate level implementation [1] and
reveal the functionality of the design [6]. Software tools are
used to reverse engineer the chip [7], [8]. An adversary can use
reverse engineering to steal IP, illegally fabricate ICs and insert
Hardware Trojans. Design-for-Trust techniques thwart reverse
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engineering of CMOS-based logic circuits. Obfuscation tech-
niques have been proposed to hide the implementation and
the functionality of the design by inserting additional gates,
which are controlled by a secret key [9]–[11]. The design
can function correctly only when the correct key is applied
to these gates. IC camouflaging is a layout-level protection
against malicious end users from extracting the gate level
implementation of the design [12]–[14]. In camouflaging,
layouts of the standard logic gates are designed to look alike.
Most of these considerations focus on conventional CMOS-
based technologies.
Reversible logic is a novel computing paradigm where one
obtains not only the output value for a given input value but
also the other way around. Obviously, reversible logic signif-
icantly differs from conventional CMOS-based non-reversible
logic. In traditional CMOS-based logic, it is possible to infer
some of the inputs of a conventional NAND gate if its
output is 0 (then, both inputs are 1) while it is not possible
to unambiguously infer the input values if the NAND gate
output is a 1. Reversible circuits realize bijective n-input n-
output functions that map each possible input vector to a
unique output vector. This is beneficial in building quantum
computing architectures [15] since quantum computations are
inherently reversible [16], [17].
Besides, reversible logic has applications in low power
computing [18], [19], adiabatic computing [20], encoder/de-
coder design [21]–[23], circuit verification [24], and optical
computing [25].
Security assessment of reversible circuits is the focus of this
paper. Reversible circuits differ significantly from conventional
circuits and hence may be susceptible to these and other
threats. For example, in reversible circuits fanout and feedback
are not (directly) allowed and each circuit is realized as a
cascade of reversible gates. Similarly, the function (which is
not necessarily reversible) is embedded into a reversible circuit
structure resulting in ancillary inputs and garbage outputs. We
investigate how these unique constraints inform the security
of reversible circuits with a particular focus on reverse engi-
neering. We investigate the challenges for a reverse engineer
assuming different levels of knowledge about the synthesis
schemes. Next, we propose a metric to quantify the ability
of a design to resist reverse engineering. Finally, we propose
scrambling the inputs and outputs to make reverse engineering
difficult. Overall, this paper provides a first understanding of
the risks of reverse engineering in reversible logic.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II provides a background on reversible logic. Then, reverse
engineering of reversible circuits is analyzed in detail for
different threat models in Section III. In Section IV, we
provide a simple input/output scrambling solution to thwart
reverse engineering of reversible circuits. Experimental results
in Section V demonstrate the difficulty of reverse engineering
of non-reversible functions embedded into reversible circuits
implementations and report the number of possible embed-
dings encountered by an attacker. We evaluate the proposed
scrambling technique with respect to the number of possible
embeddings and the costs. We conclude the paper in Sec-
tion VI.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide an overview of reversible logic
and established automatic synthesis approaches to realize a
(not necessarily reversible) target function using reversible
logic gates.
A. Reversible Logic
A reversible logic circuit has an equal number of input and
output signals. Furthermore, the reversible circuit realizes a
bijection, i.e. each input assignment maps to a unique output
assignment. Accordingly, computations can be performed in
both directions (from the inputs to the outputs and vice versa).
Reversible circuits are implemented as cascades of
reversible gates. Each reversible gate over the inputs
X = {x1, . . . , xn} consists of a (possibly empty) set Ci ⊆
{xj | xj ∈ X} ∪ {xj | xj ∈ X} of positive (xj) and
negative (xj) control lines and a set T ⊂ X \ C of target
lines. The most commonly used reversible gate is the Toffoli
gate TOF (C, xt) [26], which consists of a single target
line xt ∈ X \ C whose value is inverted if all values on the
positive (negative) control lines are set to 1 (0) or if C = ∅. All
remaining values are passed through the gate unaltered. The
cost of a reversible circuit is defined either by the number of
gates or by so called quantum cost [27]. The quantum cost
of a Toffoli gate with C positive control lines is computed as
2C+1 − 3, while for negative control lines, the quantum cost
is computed in the same way except for the case where the
Toffoli gate is entirely composed of negative control lines in
which the cost is increased by two [28].
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Fig. 1. A reversible circuit with three Toffoli gates.
Example 1. Fig. 1 shows a reversible circuit composed of
three circuit lines and three Toffoli gates. The circuit is labeled
with the values on the circuit lines for input x3x2x1 = 001.
The first gate g1 = TOF ({x1}, x3) inverts the value of the
target line x3 since the positive control line x1 is initial-
ized to 1. The second gate g2 = TOF ({x3, x2}, x1) inverts
the value of the target line x1. In contrast, the third gate
y
x
cin
0
-
-
sum
cout
Fig. 2. A full adder is a non-reversible function. It can be implemented using
reversible Toffoli gates, one ancillary input, and two garbage outputs.
g3 = TOF ({x1}, x2) keeps the value of the target line x2
intact, since the positive control line x1 is 0.
In order to realize non-reversible functions, ancillary in-
puts and garbage outputs are used. An ancillary input of a
reversible circuit is an input that is set to a fixed value (either
0 or 1). A garbage output of a reversible circuit is an output,
which is a don’t care for all possible input conditions.
Example 2. Fig. 2 shows the realization of a full adder using
reversible gates with the top input of the reversible circuit
set to 0. The bottom two outputs are garbage outputs of this
circuit.
B. Reversible Logic Synthesis
Several approaches to automatically synthesize non-
reversible and reversible functions using reversible gates have
been proposed (see e.g. [29]–[34]). These synthesis approaches
either implicitly or explicitly embed the target (reversible or
non-reversible) function into a reversible function.
TABLE I
FULL ADDER AND A POSSIBLE EMBEDDING INTO A REVERSIBLE
FUNCTION.
(a) Full Adder
cin x y cout sum
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 ?
1 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 0 ?
1 1 1 1 1 1
(b) Reversible Embedding
0 cin x y cout sum g1 g2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Example 3. Consider the full adder in Table I(a). The full
adder has the carry in cin and summands x and y as the inputs
and the carry out cout and the sum as the outputs. The full
adder is not reversible since (1) the number of inputs differs
from the number of outputs and (2) there is no unique input-
output mapping. Adding an additional output to the function
does not make it reversible. The first four rows of the truth
table can be embedded with respect to reversibility as shown
in the rightmost column of Table I(a). However, since cout = 0
and sum = 1 already appeared twice (marked in bold), a
unique embedding for the fifth row of the truth table is no
longer possible. The same holds for the italicized rows.
Overall, at least ⌈log(m)⌉ garbage outputs are required to
make a non-reversible function reversible, where m is the
maximum number of times an output pattern is repeated in the
truth table of the target function [35]–[37]. Since three output
patterns are repeated in the full adder truth table, ⌈log(3)⌉ = 2
garbage outputs and, hence, one additional ancillary input are
required to make the function reversible.
The value of the ancillary inputs can be chosen by the
designer. Garbage outputs are by definition don’t cares leading
to an incompletely specified function. However, many synthe-
sis approaches require a completely specified function so that
all don’t cares are assigned a concrete value. The adder is
embedded in a reversible function including four variables,
one ancillary input, and two garbage outputs.
Example 4. One possible assignment to the ancillary input
and the don’t care values of the garbage output are shown
in Table I(b). Here, the target full adder is obtained if the
ancillary input cin is set to 0 and outputs cout and sum are
observed. g1 and g2 are the two garbage outputs.
State-of-the-art synthesis approaches are of two kinds: In
functional synthesis, the target function is embedded into a
fully reversible function as sketched above (using methods
such as in [36], [37]). The resulting function is synthesized
using methods directly relying on reversible function descrip-
tions [31]–[34]. In structural synthesis, the target function is
first represented by dedicated function descriptions such as
Exclusive Sum of Products (ESoPs) or Binary Decision Dia-
grams (BDDs). They are then mapped to reversible circuits.
Here, embedding is implicitly conducted during synthesis.
[29], [30] are well-known structural synthesis approaches.
In both schemes, the use of ancillary inputs and garbage
outputs is essential to realize a non-reversible target function
in reversible logic.
III. REVERSE ENGINEERING OF REVERSIBLE CIRCUITS
Reversible circuits obtained using the state-of-the-art syn-
thesis methods are challenging to an adversary1 who has
access to the gate level implementation aiming to reverse
engineer a circuit. We illustrate these challenges first. Then,
we discuss several reverse engineering threat models.
A. Challenges for Reverse Engineering
An adversary who has access to the gate level im-
plementation of a circuit realizing a reversible function
can trivially reverse engineer it. However, when a non-
reversible function is embedded into a reversible circuit, a
major challenge for the reverse engineer, who is unaware of
the location of the inputs and outputs of the target function,
is to identify the value and the location of the ancillary input
bits and the location of the garbage output bits – both are vital
to reverse engineer the target function.
Example 5. Consider the full adder embedding shown in
Fig. 2. If the attacker is unaware of the location and values
1either in the foundry or an end user.
of the ancillary inputs, he/she cannot determine the target
function. If cin is the ancillary input bit, setting cin to 0,
results in sum = x⊕ y, while setting cin to 1, results in
sum = x⊕ y. Another challenge for the attacker is to
identify the primary and garbage output bits. In Fig. 2, any
of the four output bits can be a garbage output. From the
designer’s perspective, the reversible circuit in Fig. 2 realizes
a full adder. Hence, he/she knows the primary outputs and the
garbage outputs of the target function. If this information is
unavailable, it is difficult to reverse engineer the functionality.
Overall, the ancillary inputs and garbage outputs can nat-
urally hide the embedded, non-reversible target function. The
key question is how can an attacker identify the ancillary
inputs and determine their values and identify the garbage
outputs from a gate-level netlist?
In the remainder of this paper, we will discuss these
reverse engineering challenges. Different threat models will be
considered according to the level of knowledge the attacker has
about the synthesis approach used to derive the circuit. More
precisely, what if the attacker
• is ignorant of the synthesis method used to generate the
circuit,
• knows the synthesis method used to generate the circuit.
B. Reverse Engineering without Knowing the Synthesis Ap-
proach
If the attacker does not know how the circuit has been
obtained, he/she cannot distinguish the garbage outputs from
the primary outputs and the ancillary inputs from the primary
inputs. Hence, his/her primary goal is to determine the location
and value of the ancillary inputs as well as the location of the
garbage outputs. We first derive the number of possible target
functions embedded into a reversible circuit. This presents the
difficulty of reverse engineering for an attacker. This analysis
is independent of the synthesis approach used to generate the
reversible circuit.
Assume that a reversible circuit has n input/output bits.
There are 2n possible input/output combinations. The cir-
cuit can be represented as a function f(x1, x2, · · · , xn) =
(y1, y2, · · · , yn). Each xi can be either a primary input of the
target function or an ancillary input, while each yi, can be
either a primary output of the target function or a garbage
output, where i varies from 1 to n.
Each output yi, can be computed as yi =
fi(xi1 , xi2 , · · · , ximi ), where mi (1 ≤ mi ≤ n) is the
number of inputs that drive yi. Let ki (0 ≤ ki ≤ mi) be the
number of inputs that drive yi but not yp where p anywhere
in the interval from 1 to i − 1 (1 ≤ p < i). The number
of possible embedded functions in yi can be obtained by
considering any subset of the ki inputs as ancillary inputs.
Thus, the number of possible embedded functions for yi is
e(ki) =
ki∑
j=0
C(ki, j)× 2
j (1)
where the binomial coefficient C(ki, j) refers to the number of
ways (combinations) of selecting j unordered ancillary inputs
from ki inputs. We denote the number of embedded functions
with n primary output bits of a reversible circuit as
E(n,K) =
n∏
i=1
e(ki) (2)
where ki ∈ K .
However, each output bit of a reversible circuit can be
either a primary or a garbage output. Thus, the number of
all possible target functions embedded into a reversible circuit
with n inputs/outputs is
EMB(n,K) = (2n − 1)× E(n,K) (3)
where 2n−1 indicates the number of all possible combinations
of the output bits of a reversible circuit. We subtract one to
exclude the case where all the output bits of a reversible circuit
are garbage.
Example 6. In Fig. 1, k1 = 3, k2 = 0, and k3 = 0. Thus, e1 =
27, e2 = 1, and e3 = 1. The number of possible embedded
functions is 27× (23 − 1) = 189.
From the attacker’s perspective, it is hard to differentiate the
target function from the other possible function embeddings.
The number of possible embeddings can thus be used as
the metric to assess the strength of defenses for reversible
circuits against reverse engineering.
C. Reverse Engineering Knowing the Synthesis Approach
Next, we analyze how the attack changes when the adver-
sary is aware of the synthesis approach used to generate the
reversible circuit. More precisely, does the knowledge of the
synthesis approach help the attacker to identify the positions
and values of constant inputs and garbage outputs?
The attacker may utilize visualization tools such as [38] to
highlight the structure and properties of a reversible circuit.
Based on this information, the structure of the reversible
circuit can be analyzed, the applied synthesis approach can
be identified, and, possibly the target function can be reverse
engineered.
In the following, we discuss this case considering circuits
obtained by both, structural synthesis and functional syn-
thesis reviewed in Section II-B. BDD-based synthesis [30]
represents a structural synthesis approach and QMDD-based
synthesis [39] represents a functional synthesis approach.
1) BDD-based Synthesis of Reversible Logic: In BDD-
based synthesis as proposed in [30], the target function is
provided in terms of a Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) [40],
i.e. a directed acyclic graph G = (V,E) where e.g. a Shannon
decomposition
f = xi · fxi=0 + xi · fxi=1
is carried out in each node v ∈ V . The function fxi=0 (fxi=1)
is the negative (positive) co-factor of f obtained by assigning
xi to 0 (1). In the following, the node representing fxi=0
Fig. 3. BDD of f = x1x2x3x4 + x1x2x3x4 + x1x2x3x4 + x1x2x3x4
(fxi=1) is denoted by low(v) (high(v)), while xi is called
the select variable.
Example 7. Fig. 3 shows a BDD representing the func-
tion f = x1x2x3x4 + x1x2x3x4 + x1x2x3x4 + x1x2x3x4 as
well as the respective co-factors resulting from the application
of the Shannon decomposition.
Given a BDD G = (V,E) of a function, a corresponding
reversible circuit can easily be derived. To this end, all
nodes v ∈ V of G are traversed in a depth-first fashion and
substituted with a cascade of reversible gates. The respective
cascade of gates depends on the successors of the node v.
Fig. 4 shows a look-up table that maps different nodes of the
BDD to their corresponding reversible sub-circuits. Note that
this often requires an additional (ancillary) circuit line in order
to realize the non-reversible decomposition employed in this
node. To obtain a reversible circuit realizing f the entire BDD
should be traversed.
Example 8. Consider the BDD from Fig. 3. The co-factor f1
can easily be represented by the primary input x4. Having
the value of f1 available, the co-factor f2 can be realized
by the first two gates depicted in Fig. 52. In this manner,
respective sub-circuits can be added for all remaining co-
factors until a circuit representing the overall function f
results. The remaining steps are shown in Fig. 5.
Thus, to realize the target function, decomposition is applied
leading to smaller sub-functions for which existing building
blocks can be applied. Then, the resulting sub-circuits can be
composed to realize the overall function. Overall, this realizes
arbitrary (i.e. not necessarily reversible) functions – at the
expense of a huge number of additional lines leading to many
ancillary inputs and garbage outputs.
2) Reverse Engineering BDD-based Reversible Circuits:
BDD-based synthesis yields structured reversible circuits from
which several properties can easily be obtained.
Example 9. Consider the circuit obtained by BDD-based
synthesis as shown in Fig. 5. Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(b) show
2Note that an additional circuit line is added to preserve the values of x4
and x3 which are still needed by the co-factors f3 and f4, respectively.
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Fig. 4. Look-up table for reversible cascades representing Shannon decom-
position of BDD. High(f ) (low(f )) indicates the value of function f when
the input xi is set to 1 (0).
a visualization (obtained by RevVis [38]) highlighting the
positions of the ancillary inputs and garbage outputs as well as
the positions of control (green color) and target (yellow color)
lines, respectively. The green region indicates the location of
the primary inputs, which directly drive the garbage output bits
of the BDD-based reversible circuit. The remaining inputs are
ancillary inputs as illustrated in Fig. 6(a). The primary output
of the reversible circuit is connected to the target line of right
most gate as shown in Fig. 6(a).
In circuits obtained using BDD-based synthesis,
1) the primary inputs are directly connected to the garbage
outputs and
2) an intermediate output of a sub-circuit that has no control
over other reversible gates is a primary output.
The attacker can exploit these properties to reveal the
p0 p3p1 p2 p4 p5
x8
x7
x6
x5
x4
x3
x2
x1
y8
y7
y6
y5  = f
y4
y3
y2
y1
0
0
1
0
f2
f3
f4
f5
f6
f1
Fig. 5. Reversible Circuit derived from the BDD of f , where pi is the ith
partition of the reversible circuit.
function embedded in a reversible circuit by:
1) Distinguishing between primary and garbage outputs.
2) Identifying the location of the ancillary inputs.
3) Identifying the value of the ancillary inputs.
(a) (b)
Fig. 6. Visualization of Reversible Circuits: (a) Ancillary Inputs and Garbage
Outputs, (b) Target and Control Lines
First, the attacker distinguishes the primary and garbage
outputs of the reversible circuit. As shown in Fig. 6(b), the
lines of the reversible circuit in the green region do not include
any target line, and thus, they are connected to the garbage
outputs, while the gate at the rightmost part of the reversible
circuit is connected to the primary output. To this end, the
second property discussed above can be exploited. Then, the
attacker reveals the location of the ancillary inputs based on
the first property. Finally, the attacker discovers the value of
the ancillary inputs as follows:
1) Partitioning the reversible circuit into sub-circuits.
2) Identifying the ancillary input values of the sub-circuits.
Decomposition of a target function generates different co-
factors, which can be represented as nodes of the BDD.
Each node is substituted with the corresponding sub-circuit.
Some sub-circuits have a unique structure, which enables
identifying the associated ancillary input value, while others
behave as universal gates, which can be reconfigured to
support different sub-functions depending on the associated
ancillary input value. A reverse engineer can extract the value
of the ancillary inputs associated with sub-circuits which
have a unique structure. Assuming that the attacker knows
the decomposition used to generate the BDD-based reversible
circuit, he/she can generate the look-up table shown in Fig. 4.
The attacker partitions the reversible circuit into sub-circuits,
where each sub-circuit consists of the maximum number of
adjacent reversible gates that match at least one sub-circuit in
the look-up table3. Then the attacker maps each sub-circuit of
the reversible circuit to the corresponding node in the look-up
table to identify the associated ancillary input value, and thus,
the target function.
Example 10. In Fig. 4, case 4 and 5 show an example of a
sub-circuit that can represent any of two co-factors (nodes)
depending on the associated ancillary input value. On the
other hand, the sub-circuits in case 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7 represent
unique co-factors (nodes).
Example 11. To illustrate the attack let us consider the re-
versible circuit in Fig. 5. BDD-based synthesis using Shannon
decomposition is utilized to create the reversible circuit. The
attacker first identifies the primary output, which is y5 using
the second property of the BDD-based reversible circuit. Also,
he/she identifies the location of garbage outputs as they are
directly connected to the inputs; Here they are y1, y2, y3,
and y4 derived using the first and second properties of the
BDD-based reversible circuit. From the attacker perspective
y6, y7, and y8 are potential primary outputs. Then, the attacker
determines the location of the ancillary inputs, which are x5,
x6, x7, and x8 using the first property of the BDD-based
reversible circuit. Next, the attacker partitions the reversible
gates into sub-circuits as explained above. As shown in Fig. 5,
the number of partitions is six. Lets consider pi as the i
th
partition of the reversible circuit. p1, p2, and p3 are mapped to
case 7, 6, and 2 in Fig. 4, respectively. Thus, p1, p2, and p3 can
be uniquely identified. As a result, the value of the ancillary
inputs x6, x7, and x8 are 1, 0, and 0, respectively. However, p0
can be mapped to case 4 or 5. Each of these two cases results
in a different co-factor, which requires a different ancillary
input bit value. As a result, the number of possible functions
at y5 is 2. In general, for m unknown ancillary input bits that
drive a primary output yi, the number of possible realized
functions at yi is 2
m. For each of the remaining output bits
y6, y7, and y8, the number of possible embeddings is 1. Thus,
the number of possible embeddings for the reversible circuit
in Fig. 5 is 23 × 2, in which 23 indicates the number of all
possible combinations of selecting potential primary output
bits as primary output bits of the reversible circuit.
As we show in the experimental section, one can success-
fully identify all the primary outputs of reversible circuits
synthesized using BDD-based tools.
3) Functional Synthesis of Reversible Logic: The embed-
ded function in a reversible circuit may be hidden under
different configurations of ancillary inputs and garbage outputs
bits. Embedding a function results in a different number and
value of ancillary inputs, while maintaining reversibility. In
addition, the value of the garbage outputs as well as the
outputs of the non-functional input assignments can be chosen
arbitrary as long as they satisfy reversibility. Selecting the
number and the value of the ancillary inputs combined with the
possible locations where the garbage and the primary outputs
3This partitioning will maintain the structure of the BDD.
can be placed can make reverse engineering of the target
function more difficult.
Example 12. Table I(b) illustrates one possible embedding
of the 1-bit adder into a reversible circuit. The value of
the ancillary input that activates the target function, 0 in
this example, can be replaced by a 1. Furthermore, one can
assign different values to garbage output bits g1 and g2, while
maintaining reversibility. For example, for input vector cinxy
= 000, g1 g2 can be assigned 00, 01, 10, or 11. The output of
the non-functional input assignments, when the ancillary input
is 1 in this example, such as cinxy = 000, can be assigned an
arbitrary value as well, such as coutsumg1g2 = 1100, as long
as the given output is not used as an output for a functional
input assignment that precedes this output in Table I(b).
Quantum Multiple-valued Decision Diagrams (QMDD)-
based synthesis [39] takes the reversible function generated
by the embedding step and creates a reversible circuit. We
omit the details of QMDD-based synthesis since the ancillary
inputs and garbage outputs are placed during the embedding
phase which is a preprocessing step prior to the functional
synthesis approach. As discussed above, due to the embedding
step, the structure of the resulting reversible circuit varies in
the value, the number, and the location of the ancillary inputs
as well as in the value and position of the garbage outputs.
Example 13. Fig. 7 shows the three possible reversible
circuits for a 1-bit adder shown in Table I(a) which have been
obtained by QMDD-based synthesis with different values and
numbers of ancillary inputs, garbage outputs, and outputs of
non-functional input assignments.
0
0
(a)
0
(b)
1
(c)
Fig. 7. QMDD-based reversible circuit of a 1-bit adder with: (a) two ancillary
input bits of value 00, (b) a single ancillary input bit of value 0, (c) a single
ancillary input bit of value 1.
Assume that the attacker is unaware of the number, the
value, and the location of ancillary input bits as well as the
number and the value of the garbage outputs. That means, even
if the attacker knows the used synthesis scheme, the number
of possible target functions remains the same. The complexity
of reverse engineering is introduced by the embedding phase
and not the synthesis step, which makes it difficult to reverse
engineer a reversible circuit by a rogue in the foundry even if
he/she has access to the gate level netlist of the synthesized
reversible circuit with the knowledge of the applied functional
synthesis approach.
IV. INPUT AND OUTPUT SCRAMBLING
We have shown that the functional synthesis approaches
(such as QMDD) are more resilient than structural synthesis
approaches (such as BDD) to reverse engineering. To hamper
reverse engineering of BDD-based reversible circuits, we
propose scrambling the inputs or outputs of a synthesized
reversible circuit by adding extra ancillary inputs or garbage
outputs. Scrambling of inputs entails, not identifying which
inputs are primary inputs and which inputs are ancillary inputs
and what constant values are assigned to these ancillary inputs,
while scrambling of the output entails, not identifying which
outputs are primary outputs and which are garbage outputs.
Extra ancillary inputs or garbage outputs are added to the
target function before the synthesis step. While the knowledge
of the structural synthesis approach can assist in identifying the
location and the value of the ancillary inputs and the location
of the garbage output, the extra ancillary inputs and garbage
outputs are independent of the structural synthesis approach.
Scrambling the ancillary inputs and the garbage outputs will
hinder an attacker’s ability to discover the target function.
Structural synthesis approaches, which realize arbitrary
functions add additional ancillary inputs and garbage outputs
regardless of the target functions, and thus, resulting in large
number of circuit lines but relatively small quantum cost.
While the attacker is able to identify the majority of the
ancillary input bits of a reversible circuit generated using
BDD-synthesis approach, in the presence of the extra ancillary
inputs added prior to the realization of the embedded function,
every input is a potential ancillary input. As a result, the
number of possible embeddings increases significantly.
Example 14. Fig. 8(a) illustrates the BDD-based reversible
circuit of function f in Fig. 3 in the presence of an extra
ancillary input x5 of value 0. Our proposed attack with the
information of the synthesis approach in Section III-C2 can
identify three ancillary input bits out of five introduced by the
synthesis approach. However, the extra ancillary input can be
any input classified as primary input by a reverse engineer.
x1, x2, x3, x4, or x5 are possible locations for the ancillary
input.
Moreover, in the presence of extra garbage bits, every
output of a reversible circuit generated using BDD-based (and
thus structural) synthesis can be a potential output bit, which
violates the second property of BDD-based reversible circuits
as indicated in Section III-C2. Thus, although the attacker can
identify most of the ancillary input bits, he/she can no longer
differentiate the primary outputs from the garbage outputs,
resulting in a significant number of possible embeddings.
Example 15. Fig. 8(b) illustrates the BDD-based reversible
circuit of function f in Fig. 3 in the presence of an extra
f
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Fig. 8. The reversible circuit of the target function in Fig. 3 in the presence
of (a) single extra ancillary input and (b) single extra garbage output.
garbage output g1. Both g1 and f are connected to intermedi-
ate outputs of sub-circuits that do not control other reversible
gates. In other words, the attacker can no longer distinguish
g1 from f .
The size of the additional garbage outputs and ancillary
inputs is driven by two optimization criteria, (1) maximizing
the number of embeddings ,and thus, the security level, and
(2) minimizing the quantum cost. Increasing the number of
garbage outputs and ancillary inputs results in increasing not
only the number circuit lines and the quantum cost, but also
the number of embeddings. In the experimental section, we
analyze the trade-off between the security level in the presence
of extra ancillary inputs/garbage outputs and their associated
quantum cost.
Functional synthesis approaches can exploit the extra an-
cillary inputs and garbage outputs effectively to support re-
versibility at the expensive of large quantum cost.
Example 16. An ancillary input k can be added to the target
function in Table I(a) with a value 0. The embedding phase
takes updated target function as an input and generates the
corresponding reversible function. One potential reversible
function is given in Table I(b). Similarly, one can insert
a garbage output bit such as g1 to the target function in
Table I(a), which can also lead to the reversible function in
Table I(b).
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To evaluate the difficulty of extracting the target (non-
reversible) function from the reversible circuit, we have con-
ducted various experiments. In each experiment, we report the
number of possible embeddings as a security metric and the
TABLE II
NUMBER OF EMBEDDED FUNCTIONS IN REVERSIBLE CIRCUITS CREATED USING BDD-BASED SYNTHESIS.
Benchmark
# Quant. Without synthesis Info. With synthesis info.
I/O Garbage Ancilla Cost % #Embed % #Embed
Garbage func. D_Ancill func.
4mod5_8 7 6 3 24 66.7 15309 66.7 8
4mod7_26 12 10 8 86 40 1.36E+08 100 32
4_49_7 15 11 11 126 36.4 2.94E+10 81.8 512
5xp1_90 30 20 23 254 30 3.45E+21 91.3 65536
9symml_91 27 26 18 206 34.6 2.00E+18 100 131072
add6_92 54 47 42 499 25.5 2.56E+38 100 3.44E+10
adr4_93 16 11 8 74 72.7 1.10E+10 100 8
aj-e11_81 16 12 12 130 33.3 1.76E+11 83.3 1024
alu1_94 28 20 16 139 60 1.50E+18 93.8 512
alu2_96 105 99 95 1436 10.1 2.69E+76 89.5 6.34E+29
alu3_97 66 58 56 644 17.2 2.23E+48 76.8 2.31E+18
alu4_98 541 533 527 7222 2.6 9.27169e+376 93.4 5.90E+166
apex2_101 498 495 459 5922 7.9 1.1339e+317 96.3 2.44E+142
apex4_103 547 528 538 8343 1.7 1.24077e+382 91.4 1.21E+170
apla_107 103 91 93 1002 11 1.38E+77 82.8 1.58E+29
sao2_199 74 70 64 667 14.3 3.74E+54 73.4 1.51E+23
C7552_119 35 19 30 202 26.3 5.37E+25 50 5.37E+08
clip_124 66 61 57 704 14.8 4.45E+48 78.9 1.84E+19
cm150a_128 37 36 16 186 58.3 2.95E+22 0 2.15E+09
cm151a_129 49 40 30 298 47.5 2.57E+32 70 1.07E+09
cm42a_125 22 12 18 117 33.3 8.23E+15 50 131072
cm82a_126 13 10 8 82 50 4.07E+08 100 32
cm85a_127 36 33 25 275 33.3 5.04E+24 56 8.59E+09
cmb_134 43 40 27 158 40 4.41E+28 100 1.68E+07
co14_135 27 26 13 159 53.8 6.25E+16 100 4096
con1_136 16 14 9 96 50 2.20E+10 77.8 512
cordic_138 52 50 29 325 46 3.47E+33 79.3 8.59E+09
cu_141 38 28 24 220 50 2.27E+25 66.7 4.19E+06
dc1_142 20 13 16 160 30.8 2.29E+14 87.5 2048
decod_137 35 19 30 202 26.3 5.37E+25 50 5.37E+08
dist_144 79 74 71 975 10.8 1.16E+59 100 7.38E+19
dk17_145 58 47 48 426 21.3 1.33E+42 77.1 2.81E+14
ex5p_154 206 143 198 1843 5.6 7.78E+157 65.7 1.29E+61
example2_156 105 99 95 1436 10.1 2.69E+76 89.5 6.34E+29
f2_158 16 12 12 113 33.3 1.76E+11 58.3 8192
f51m_159 385 377 371 5392 3.7 1.43E+252 91.9 2.02E+118
hwb6_14 46 40 40 507 15 9.74E+33 92.5 1.37E+11
hwb7_15 73 67 66 909 10.4 4.99E+54 92.4 1.84E+19
hwb8_64 112 105 104 1461 7.6 1.29E+80 95.2 2.54E+30
max46_177 54 53 45 598 17 2.05E+39 77.8 1.80E+16
misex3_180 428 414 414 4661 3.4 8.80261e+312 68.6 3.51E+159
mlp4_184 103 95 95 1158 8.4 5.51E+77 94.7 4.95E+27
sqn_203 40 37 33 426 18.9 1.04E+29 69.7 1.10E+12
sqrt8_205 30 26 22 240 30.8 8.64E+20 72.7 1.68E+07
xor5_195 6 5 1 8 100 729 100 1
z4ml_225 14 10 7 66 70 6.07E+08 100 8
tial_214 578 570 564 7609 2.5 9.75474e+379 94.9 1.27E+176
urf2_73 209 201 201 3187 4 6.33E+145 89.1 5.27E+64
quantum cost. We show the trade off between the security level
and the hardware cost. First, we reverse engineer reversible
circuits without the knowledge of the synthesis approach that
generates the reversible circuit. Second, we reverse engineer
reversible circuits with the knowledge of the applied synthesis
approach. Finally, we launch our attacks on reversible circuits
generated after adding extra ancillary inputs or garbage outputs
to the target function. We consider reversible circuits generated
using BDD-based synthesis as an example of the structural
synthesis and QMDD-based synthesis as an example of the
functional synthesis provided in RevLib [41].
A. Reverse Engineering without Knowing the Synthesis Ap-
proach
In the first set of the experiments we assume that the
attacker does not know the synthesis approach used to generate
the reversible circuit. In Table II and III, we measure the
number of possible embeddings of BDD- and QMDD-based
reversible circuits, respectively. In Table II, column 1 through
5 indicate the target circuit name, the number of input/output
bits, garbage output bits, and ancillary input bits, and the
quantum cost of the reversible circuit, respectively. Column
6 and 7 are measured under the assumption that the attacker
does not know the applied synthesis approach. %Garbage in
column 6 reports the percentage of leaked garbage output bits
due to the direct connection between some of the inputs and
outputs of the reversible circuit. These output bits can be easily
classified as garbage outputs if the attacker has access to the
gate level implementation of the circuit. #Embed func. reports
the number of possible embeddings in column 7.
Table II shows that on average the attacker can identify 42%
of the garbage output bits in BDD-based reversible circuits.
However, the number of garbage output bits of BDD-based
reversible circuits is significantly large. This is due to the fact
that every node of the BDD can produce a garbage output.
Moreover, the location and the value of the ancillary inputs are
unknown to the attacker forcing him to explore a large number
of possible embeddings using equation 3 in Section III-B.
The QMDD-based synthesis approach generates the re-
versible circuits whose core data is summarized in Table III,
using arbitrary values to ancillary inputs that satisfy the
reversibility. Column 1 through 4 indicate the circuit name,
the number of input/output bits, and garbage output bits, and
the percentage of leaked garbage output bits by the attacker
due to the direct connection between inputs and outputs of the
reversible circuit, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 summarize
the quantum cost and the number of possible embeddings,
respectively.
The results show that the percentage of identified garbage
output bits of QMDD-based reversible circuits is 35% on
average. The number of embeddings of reversible circuits
generated using BDD and QMDD synthesis approach is very
large. However, the quantum cost of QMDD-based reversible
circuits exceeds the corresponding one of BDD-based re-
versible circuits. We conclude that while reverse engineering
reversible circuits with no information of the applied synthesis
approach is always difficult, the quantum cost varies signifi-
cantly based on the applied synthesis approach.
B. Reverse Engineering Knowing the Synthesis Approach
In the second set of the experiments, we assume that
the attacker knows the synthesis approach used to generate
the reversible circuit. We launch our attack on BDD-based
reversible circuits, while we note that reverse engineering
QMDD-based reversible circuits with/without knowing the
synthesis approach yields the same results. Column 8 through
9 in Table II provide the percentage of recovered ancillary
input bits and the number of possible embeddings after reverse
engineering the same BDD-based reversible circuits used in
the previous experiment, however, giving that the attacker
knows the applied synthesis approach.
We conclude that the attacker can identify the majority of
the constant input bits value of BDD-based reversible circuits.
On average 81.6% of the ancillary input bits can be recovered
by the attacker. Thus, the attacker can identify most of the
target function. The large number of possible embeddings in
column 9 is due to the large number of potential primary
outputs. Although the attacker can recover the location of
primary outputs that satisfy the second property of BDD-based
reversible circuits in Section III-C2, he/she can not determine
TABLE III
NUMBER OF EMBEDDED FUNCTIONS IN REVERSIBLE CIRCUITS CREATED
USING QMDD-BASED SYNTHESIS.
Benchmark
#Inp Garbage Quant. #Embed
/Out # % Cost Cir
4mod5-v0_18 5 4 0.0 93 5.49E+06
4mod7-v1_96 5 3 33.3 187 2.31E+06
5xp1_194 17 7 14.3 2803 6.75E+35
add6_196 19 12 8.3 16626 5.91E+39
adr4_197 13 8 12.5 1625 4.98E+22
aj-e11_165 4 0 - 89 710775
alu1_198 20 12 25.0 215 5.65E+46
alu2_199 16 10 40.0 28010 2.14E+30
alu3_200 18 10 0.0 11156 2.54E+47
alu4_201 22 14 28.6 3987932 2.39E+58
apex4_202 28 9 44.4 282265 9.32E+95
apla_203 22 10 0.0 18935 3.77E+80
C7552_205 21 5 40.0 980 1.77E+74
clip_206 14 9 44.4 35353 1.45E+31
cm150a_210 22 21 0.0 2023 2.13E+75
cm151a_211 28 19 68.4 8415 2.32E+49
cm152a_212 12 11 72.7 236 5.19E+10
cm42a_207 14 4 0.0 307 1.51E+36
cm82a_208 8 5 40.0 155 7.32E+10
cm85a_209 14 11 45.5 10242 2.31E+32
cmb_214 20 17 23.5 32775 8.24E+49
co14_215 15 14 14.3 229375 1.07E+25
con1_216 9 7 42.9 254 1.20E+13
cordic_218 25 23 8.7 102742609 7.00E+39
cu_219 25 15 33.3 9674 1.47E+67
dc1_220 11 4 0.0 368 6.72E+23
dk17_224 21 10 0.0 8284 8.62E+76
example2_231 16 10 40.0 28010 3.04E+36
f51m_233 22 14 42.9 1028459 1.83E+66
hwb6_56 6 0 - 7358 6.01E+11
hwb7_59 7 1 0.0 31411 2.74E+15
hwb8_113 8 1 0.0 150218 3.68E+19
misex3_242 28 14 50.0 3321686 3.25E+122
mlp4_245 16 8 75.0 12345 5.72E+47
sqn_258 10 7 0.0 3225 4.61E+20
sqrt8_260 12 8 0.0 1529 8.82E+27
xor5_254 6 5 60.0 16 2.18E+07
urf2_277 8 0 - 120705 3.68E+19
table3_264 28 14 35.7 4310154 1.51E+149
sao2_257 14 10 0.0 47224 6.94E+32
pm1_249 14 4 0.0 307 2.99E+40
radd_250 13 8 0.0 1392 1.15E+32
root_255 13 8 25.0 11798 1.04E+33
ryy6_256 17 16 87.5 254477 2.90E+26
sym9_317 27 26 34.6 762136380 3.05E+155
squar5_261 13 5 20.0 507 1.26E+35
x2_267 17 10 30.0 1339 2.31E+32
whether the outputs of sub-circuits, which are connected to the
reversible circuit outputs and also used to control other target
lines, are garbage outputs. Thus, the number of all possible
primary output combinations increases significantly depending
on the size of these potential output bits. Our experiment
shows that the attacker can identify all the primary outputs
of the given BDD-based reversible circuits using our
proposed reverse engineering except for three reversible
circuits. In other words, the number of possible embeddings of
the BDD-based reversible circuits can be reduced significantly
by ignoring the potential primary outputs, which makes reverse
engineering easier.
Fig. 9 shows a comparison between BDD- and QMDD-
based (with 0-embedding) reversible circuits in terms of the
number of embeddings and the quantum cost of a selected
set of target functions given that the attacker knows the
applied synthesis approach. Reverse engineering BDD-based
reversible circuits generates less number of embeddings, and
thus, it is easier to attack, compared to QMDD-based re-
versible circuits. On the other hand, the quantum cost of the
QMDD-based reversible circuits exceeds the corresponding
one of BDD-based reversible circuits.
C. Reverse Engineering Reversible Circuits with Input/Output
Scrambling
We apply our attacks on BDD- and QMDD-based reversible
circuits in the presence of extra ancillary inputs and garbage
outputs. In Fig. 10, for each n input/output reversible circuit,
we created five variants of the reversible circuit with 0, 0.1x,
0.2x, 0.5x, and x extra ancillary inputs, where x is the number
of input/output bits of the reversible circuit4.
Additional ancillary inputs significantly inflate the number
of embeddings of not only QMDD-based reversible circuits but
also BDD-based reversible. Every input classified as a primary
input by reverse engineering BDD-based reversible circuit can
be a potential ancillary input in the presence of our proposed
input scrambling approach, which results in a massive increase
in the number of embeddings. Moreover, increasing the num-
ber of the extra ancillary inputs in few BDD-based reversible
circuits may result in a slight reduction in the quantum cost
and the number of embeddings due to the random value of
the ancillary input bits that determines the corresponding sub-
circuits. Recall that Shannon decomposition used in BDD-
based reversible circuits generates different sub-circuits, which
have different numbers of gates. Some of these sub-circuits can
easily be used to infer the associated ancillary input bit value,
while others are difficult.
In the presence of additional garbage outputs in a BDD-
based reversible circuit, the first step of the attack can not
be applied anymore. As shown in Fig. 11, output scrambling
of BDD-based reversible circuits results in a larger number
of possible embeddings compared to input scrambling at the
expense of high quantum cost.
While we show the impact of our proposed input/out-
put scrambling on QMDD-based reversible circuits in
Fig. 10(d), 10(c), 11(d), and 11(c), we emphasize that reverse
engineering QMDD-based reversible circuits without applying
our proposed input/output scrambling is still difficult.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyze reverse engineering of reversible
logic. We focus on non-reversible functions embedded into
reversible circuits. We measure the number of possible em-
beddings of reversible circuits implemented using different
synthesis approaches and under different threat models as a
security metric to evaluate the difficulty of extracting the target
function through reverse engineering. We propose an attack to
reverse engineering reversible circuits generated using BDD-
based synthesis approach, an example of structural synthesises,
4The number of extra ancillary input bits varies from 1 to 21.
(a)
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Fig. 9. Comparison between QMDD- and BDD-based reversible circuit in
terms of (a) the number of embedding and (b) the quantum cost.
that provides scalability at the cost of significant circuit
lines overhead. We show that reversible circuits created using
functional synthesis approaches are inherently secure against
reverse engineering at the expense of high quantum cost. We
also propose a countermeasure to thwart reverse engineering of
BDD-based reversible circuits by adding extra ancillary inputs
or garbage outputs prior to the synthesis step to scramble the
inputs or the outputs of reversible circuits, respectively.
Our future work will explore reverse engineering of re-
versible circuits generated using synthesis approaches that pro-
vide both scalability and significant reduction in the number
of circuit lines. Another direction is to develop a systematic
way to identify the synthesis approach that generates a given
reversible circuit considering all the state-of-the-art synthesis
approaches.
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